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INTERNATIONAL LAW BY CONSENT OF THE 
GOVERNED 
José A. Cabranes* 
I.  INTRODUCTION1 
These days we hear more about “international law” than usual, 
especially in political discourse and the national press.  We are informed, in 
the heat of political combat, that the pellucid terms of international law 
have been flagrantly violated or, on the contrary, that international law does 
not exist or is largely a concoction of rogue regimes acting in concert. 
These oversimplifications would be harmless enough but for the fact 
that they affect public opinion and have significant real-life consequences in 
our national and international politics.  The contemporary interest in 
international law has been stimulated by the phenomenon of 
“globalization”—a fashionable, overarching term that embraces a multitude 
of international trends in trade and telecommunications.  Skepticism about 
international law has been the inevitable consequence of the sheer breadth, 
and more-then-occasional indeterminacy, of a body of law that potentially 
touches virtually any private or public transaction affecting more than one 
nation-state.  The skepticism engendered by the problem of defining and 
delimiting “international law” is reinforced by the grandiose claims for a 
seemingly unlimited body of law asserted, especially in the last generation, 
by a combination of scholars and activists who include proponents of a 
world order in which national sovereignty yields to norms elaborated by 
supranational organizations. 
                                                 
* United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit. A.B., Columbia College; J.D., Yale 
University Law School; M. Litt. (International Law), University of Cambridge.  Prior to his 
appointment to the federal bench, Judge Cabranes served as General Counsel of Yale 
University.  He was active in the work of several international law societies and he served as 
Special Counsel to the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and head of the 
Commonwealth’s office in Washington, D.C.  He has been elected to membership in the 
Council of Foreign Relations and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
1 I am grateful to the Dean and Faculty of the Valparaiso University School of Law for the 
invitation to deliver the 2006 Indiana Supreme Court Lecture, which afforded me the 
opportunity to reflect on timely aspects of customary international law.  In this lecture, I 
expand on themes developed earlier in the year in the Jon O. Newman Lecture at the 
University of Hartford, an endowed lectureship established in honor of my friend and admired 
colleague, Judge Jon O. Newman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  
These reflections rely in some measure on the jurisprudence of the Court on which I am 
priviliged to serve, including decisions which I have written or in which I have participated.  I 
would also like to thank my law clerks Bryan Leach, Jonathan Goldin, Michael Jacobsohn, and 
Anisha Dasgupta for their editorial comments and assistance. 
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Naturally, proponents of varying conceptions of international law have 
taken their causes not only to the press and the political rostrum but also to 
the courts, where litigation involving private parties, as well as nation-states 
and foreign public instrumentalities, regularly brings before our judges 
questions arising under bilateral and multilateral treaties and, significantly, 
claims under “customary international law.”  
In attempting to remain above the political fray, judges face their most 
serious challenges when asked to recognize and apply this “customary 
law,” which is an outgrowth of the historic interaction of states in a world 
community of nearly 200 sovereign states.  These are challenges for which 
most of us are understandably ill-prepared, because such situations 
invariably require judges to decide cases with little or no guidance from 
positive law adopted by democratically-elected legislatures.  As a corollary, 
such situations present judges with unequaled opportunities to decide cases 
on the basis of personal inclinations.  By presenting judges with 
opportunities to decide cases free of the restraints of positive law, cases 
asserting claims under customary international law are an open invitation 
to judges to adopt the style of common law judges—suddenly we are 
wearing the toga of Blackstone or Lord Mansfield as we decide cases by 
roving freely across the terrain of modern history and international politics. 
 In the nature of things, such judicial decisions, if wholly unmoored from 
our domestic democratic processes, will raise serious questions about the 
legitimacy of the judicial power being asserted—questions that no amount 
of instruction on judicial independence can or should silence.  
Thus, it seems to me desirable to try to explain—in a way that invokes 
basic guiding principles rather than grandiose pronouncements, even at the 
risk of appearing simplistic myself—how in the modern era international 
law is used properly and how it can be misused.  
II.  (MIS)PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Sir Isaiah Berlin once observed that the case against international law, 
like the case against historical objectivity, is that “it does not exist.”2  
Berlin’s remark captures the first of three widespread intuitions about 
international law that I would like to address—namely, that international 
law is more of an aspiration than a reality.  After all, there is no such thing 
as a World Government.3   And even if there were some international body 
charged with regularly making “international law” in the legislative sense 
                                                 
2 Ferenc M. Szasz, The Many Meanings of History, Part II, 8 HISTORY TEACHER 54, 60 (1974). 
3 See infra note 35 and accompanying text (observing that the United Nations General 
Assembly lacks law-making ability). 
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of “law,” the challenges of enforcing that law against nation-states would be 
formidable.   
Second, it may seem to the casual observer that international law is 
deeply controversial—a constant source of argument in legal and foreign 
policy circles alike.  Recent events concerning sensitive issues related to 
security and sovereignty illustrate the point.  As one example, our 
government’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th has 
sparked heated debate over whether certain laws of war apply in an 
ongoing conflict against Al-Qaeda, a group of non-state actors who 
deliberately target innocent civilians.4  As another example, the decision of 
the United States under successive national administrations not to ratify the 
treaty creating the International Criminal Court has provoked accusations 
that Americans consider themselves beyond responsibility for criminal 
acts.5   
A third popular conception is that international law is a relatively new 
phenomenon.  We are all reminded regularly that we live in an “Era of 
Globalization,” that the world is both “shrinking” and “flat,” and that 
nation-states are becoming ever more interconnected and interdependent.  
Students learn that it was only in the aftermath of the First World War that 
the League of Nations was formed, and it was only after the Second World 
War that the United Nations and the European Union were founded.  In 
light of these Twentieth Century events, it is perhaps natural for many to 
regard the development of international law as a product of recent vintage.   
I should stress that there is an element of truth to each of the three 
notions about international law that I just mentioned.  It is true that there is 
no comprehensive, definitive code of international law binding on all 
nation-states.  It is true also that international law at times evokes strident 
controversy; and that, in recent decades, international law has indeed 
acquired a degree of public prominence previously unknown. 
Current discussions of the place of international law in the scheme of 
things suggest that it might be useful to try to restate some basic 
propositions.  I will attempt to do so as I describe briefly (a) where 
international law comes from, (b) how it operates in practice, and (c) what 
aspects of international law seem to me most problematic today in the 
United States—in other words, the uses and misuses of international law. 
                                                 
4 See generally NEW WARS, NEW LAWS?  APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY 
CONFLICTS (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005). 
5 See W. Michael Reisman, Learning to Deal with Rejection:  The International Criminal Court 
and the United States, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 17, 17-18 (2004). 
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A return to basics necessarily involves great oversimplification, and it is 
entirely possible that my restatement of basic principles—which focuses on 
the relationship between democratic processes and international law (that 
is, whether and how international law reflects the consent of the governed) 
—will elicit little more than a yawn of approval reflecting a kind of 
informed ennui.  If so, I will consider this effort successful.  On the other 
hand, if this effort at restating basic rules elicits disapproval—if the idea 
that consent by sovereign states is a sine qua non of the creation of “law” 
rings hollow—I would welcome the opportunity to be informed of what 
other bedrock principles govern the development of international law.  
I should say at the outset that in our times the term “international law” 
can be used loosely to refer to many different concepts, any one of which 
could form the subject of a full lecture.  For instance, one could choose to 
focus on human rights law, international criminal law, private transactions 
between citizens of different countries, diplomatic and consular law, or, 
indeed, any analysis of legal problems touching on more than one 
country—what some call “transnational law.”6  
For the purposes of this presentation, when I refer to “international 
law,” I refer specifically to public international law, which is chiefly 
concerned with the rules, principles, customs, and agreements that nation-
states and other international entities accept as having the force of law in 
their relations with one another.  In contrast to comparative law and private 
international law, which involve the domestic laws of two or more countries 
and trans-border private disputes, public international law focuses on the 
rules that emerge from agreements between states about matters of mutual 
concern. 
Thus, my concern today is not with a related, and no less controversial, 
subject that has made its way into the mainstream media lately—the 
asserted propensity of U.S. courts to rely on foreign law when interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution and invalidating American statutory law.7  Although 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL PROBLEMS (4th ed. 2001); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law As Part of Our Law, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 52-53 (2004) (discussing “transnationalist jurisprudence” that avoids 
“distinguish[ing] sharply between the relevance of foreign and international law, recognizing 
that one prominent feature of a globalizing world is the emergence of a transnational law, 
particularly in the area of human rights, that merges the national and the international”). 
7 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (stating that, for almost 50 years, the 
Supreme Court “has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as 
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (holding that criminalization of 
consensual homosexual sex between adults is unconstitutional, and stating that “[t]he right the 
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many 
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this practice is similar to the application of international law in that they 
both allow ample space for courts to apply common law methodology, 
international law is more than an interpretive tool.  Under our 
Constitution’s express terms, international law is part of the law of the 
United States, deriving its legitimacy from the consent of sovereign states to 
be bound by certain rules and helping to order the relations of those states 
in ways that are pervasive, if not always evident to the outside observer. 
III.  ORIGINS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Public international law is not a concept of recent vintage.  Its modern 
roots lie in the natural law philosophy of Sixteenth and Seventeenth century 
Europe.  Of particularly enduring influence from that time has been the 
work of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who proposed a body of 
law applicable to all people and based on universal values divined from 
“religious, moral, rational, and historical reflections.”8  Grotius was among 
the first to expound the concept of territorial sovereignty, the principle of 
legal equality of states, and the idea of the sea as international territory. 
Certain of these principles were later recognized in the Peace of 
                                                                                                             
other countries” and “ [t]here has been no showing that in this country the governmental 
interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent”).  See 
generally, Mary Ann Glendon, Judicial Tourism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2005, at A14; Jess Bravin, 
Congress May Fight Court on Global Front, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21 2005, at A4. 
 This practice has engendered opposition not only among commentators, see, e.g., Richard 
Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2004, at 40-42; J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
423, 425-29 (2004); Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 
185 (2005), but also in Congress, see, e.g., S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005) (“Expressing the sense of 
the Senate that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United 
States should not be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions 
unless [they] inform an understanding of the original meaning of the Constitution of the 
United States.”); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005) (utilizing the same language as the Senate 
Resolution ); cf. Military Commissions Act of 2006 §  6(a)(2), Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 
2632 (“No foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the 
courts of the United States in interpreting” prohibitions of grave breaches of Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions). 
8 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 1920).  Grotius 
also emphasized the idea of “jus gentium . . . laws established by consent which look to the 
good of the great community of which all or most states are members.”  J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW 
OF NATIONS 30 (Sir Humphrey Waldock, ed., 6th ed. 1963).  Yet Grotius’s conception of consent 
was not independent of natural law’s metaphysical underpinnings.  See id. at 30-31. 
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Westphalia,9 the treaty that ended the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 and 
marked the beginning of the modern era in European history.10 
In the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, the concept of international 
law became heavily influenced by a different school of thought—the 
“Positivist” school—which emphasized the importance of treaties and 
international customs as the main sources of international obligations. The 
Positivists distinguished themselves from their predecessors by looking to 
the actual practices of states rather than to natural law.  By analyzing the 
obligations that states had actually undertaken, and how widely these 
obligations were recognized and respected, the Positivists were able to 
identify a set of rules that could be called “international law.”11 
The early and permanent imprint of the Positivist approach to 
international law can be clearly seen in the constitutional history of the 
United States.  As early as 1796, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that, 
“[w]hen the United States declared their independence, they were bound to 
receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.”12   
In fact, the Constitution expressly recognized two different kinds of 
international law.  First, it recognized the kind of international law that is 
made by agreements or treaties among nations.  Second, it recognized the 
kind of international law that arises from long-standing practice and 
custom.  This brand of international law has since come to be known as 
“customary international law.” 
The Framers provided that treaties would be part of the “supreme Law 
of the Land,”13 but specified that, in order to enjoy that venerated status, 
treaties must be ratified by the President with the advice and consent of the 
                                                 
9 See Hedley Bull, The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, in HUGO 
GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 65, 75-78 (Hedley Bull et al., eds., 1990); Leo Gross, 
The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 21-25 (1948). 
10 See generally, BRIERLY, supra note 8; L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sir Robert 
Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996).  On the treaty of Westphalia, see HERBERT 
LANGER, THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR (Blandford Press, 1980); C.V. WEDGWOOD & ANTHONY 
GRAFTON, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (2005). 
11 Indeed, it is the great Positivist Jeremy Bentham who is credited with coining the term 
“international law” to replace “the law of nations” in 1789.  M.W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the 
Fashioning of “International Law”, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 405 (1984). 
12 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.). 
13 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
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Senate.14  The authority to bind the United States to a treaty was vested in 
part in the executive branch and in part in the legislative branch precisely 
because treaties were akin to contracts between sovereign nations—and 
therefore were not perfectly analogous either to the formulation of law, the 
main function of the legislative branch, or to the implementation of law, the 
main function of the Executive.   
As Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers: 
The power of making treaties . . . . relates neither to the 
execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the [enactment] of 
new ones . . . . Its objects are CONTRACTS with foreign 
nations, which have the force of law, but derive it from the 
obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by 
the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between 
sovereign and sovereign. The power in question seems 
therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong, 
properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive.15 
But treaties were not the Framers’ sole area of international concern.  
Our Constitution also specifies that “Congress shall have Power. . . . [t]o 
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and 
Offences against the Law of Nations . . . .” 16  This is a reference to a body of 
customary international law. 
Thus, international law was not introduced to Americans or to 
American law in the Twentieth Century, either as a byproduct of the First 
World War and Wilsonian internationalism, or as a byproduct of the Second 
World War and the United States’ membership in the United Nations.  On 
the contrary, concepts of international law were quite familiar to the 
founders of the American Republic—so much so that they were woven into 
the fabric of our Constitution.  Consequently, it was possible for Chief 
Justice John Marshall to write in 1815 that “the [Supreme Court] is bound by 
the law of nations, which is part of the law of the land.”17  
Of course, since the founding of the United States, the actors and 
actions that we regard as relevant to “international law” have broadened 
                                                 
14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur . . . .”). 
15 THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (P. Ford ed., 1895). 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 1 & 10.  On the meaning of “the law of nations” in the early 
Republic, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714-15 (2004). 
17 The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815). 
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substantially.  In particular, the Twentieth Century has brought about a 
range of international organizations, such as the United Nations and its 
many specialized agencies (for example, the World Health Organization 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization), as well as supranational 
institutions, such as the European Union.  
In addition, as a direct result of Nazi atrocities and the defeat of the 
Axis Powers, international law increasingly has concerned itself with the 
basic rights of individuals, and not merely the rights and duties of nation-
states in their interactions with one another. As a result, we have seen in the 
past sixty years international agreements designed to address various 
human rights concerns—such as the U.N. International Covenant on 
Political and Civil Rights18 and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination19—both of which have 
been ratified in whole or in part by the United States.20   
IV.  THE POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES AND UNCONTROVERSIAL USES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Insofar as the evolution of international law has threatened to encroach 
upon the traditional prerogatives of the nation-state, it has generated new 
and potent controversies.  This is well illustrated, for instance, by the recent 
debate over the United States’s decision, under both Democratic and 
                                                 
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 
I.L.M. 368 (ratified by the United States June 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
19 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
December 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (ratified by the United States Oct. 21, 1994).  For a 
discussion of this agreement, see LOUIS B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 856-913, (1973). 
20 The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 subject to certain reservations, 
understandings, and declarations.  In particular, the Senate specified that “the provisions of 
Articles 1 through 27 of [the ICCPR] are not self-executing,” 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (1992), 
and “do not create a private cause of action in U.S. Courts,” S. Exec. Rep., No. 102-23, at 15 
(daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).  Accordingly, the ICCPR creates no rights enforceable by individual 
suit.  See, e.g., Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 379 (2d Cir. 2003); Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 
118, 135-36 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001).  The United States has not ratified either of the Optional 
Protocols to the ICCPR.  See Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights: Status of Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, at 11, 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.  The First Optional Protocol allows the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee to consider complaints filed by individuals under the ICCPR.  
See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A, 21, U.N. GAOR  Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).  The Second Optional 
Protocol provides for the abolition of the death penalty.  See Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/824 (1989). 
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Republican presidents, not to ratify the Rome Statute, which created the 
International Criminal Court.21   
In light of that decision, some have criticized the United States for 
lacking a due regard for international law or for failing to assume 
appropriate international responsibilities.  Those who defend the U.S. 
position have expressed a bipartisan concern at losing control over an 
important state decision—namely, the decision whether and on what terms 
to prosecute one’s own nationals for alleged crimes.22  This question is, in 
the last analysis, a question of politics, not law.  Regardless of its merits, the 
decision by both the Clinton and Bush administrations not to seek the 
Senate’s approval of the Rome Statute illustrates a strong public desire, 
across party lines, to preserve what is perceived as an important national 
prerogative and to avoid making American officials vulnerable to 
international procedures that might camouflage hostility to the policies or 
interests of the United States and its allies.23 
Yet the emergence of high-profile controversies such as this one should 
not cause us to lose sight of the fact that the United States government 
routinely generates and complies with international law in the form of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements with foreign governments.  Although 
a few well-known multilateral treaties, not accepted by the U.S., tend to 
                                                 
21 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998 
(effective July 1, 2002; U.S. not a party), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999.  Under 
the outgoing Clinton Administration, the United States signed the Rome Statute on December 
31, 2000, the last day it was open for signature; on May 6, 2002, the Government of the United 
States notified the United Nations that the United States did not intend to become a party, an 
act popularly referred to as “unsign[ing].”  Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilateralism: 
United States Policy Toward the International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 415, 421-22 
(2004); see also Peter Slevin, U.S. Renounces Its Support of New Tribunal for War Crimes, WASH. 
POST, May 7, 2002, at A01. 
22 See Orentlicher, supra note 21, at 420-21 (discussing how the Clinton Administration, 
despite being confident that the terms of the Rome Statute on their face were workable, 
nevertheless was concerned about “the risk of a runaway court-one that would respond 
sympathetically to politically-motivated charges against U.S. nationals”).  During a speech 
before the Commonwealth Club in September 2002, Al Gore stated that he approved of the 
Bush Administration’s decision not to seek ratification of the Rome Statute.  See Al Gore, 
Former Vice President, Iraq and the War on Terrorism, Answers to Written Questions From the 
Floor Following a Speech Before the Commonwealth Club of California (Sept. 23, 2002), 
http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-09gore-qa.html (“I thought that this 
world criminal court was flawed, and maybe a compromise could have been worked out but I 
thought the administration made the right call on that one-a lot of people disagree . . . .”). 
23 That the Clinton Administration did not sign the Rome Statute until the latest possible 
date, at a time when the prospect of ratification would create political fallout only for the 
incoming Republican Administration, see supra note 21, may provide a more partisan example 
of the interplay between democratic processes and international law. 
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capture the public’s imagination—such as the Rome Statute and the Kyoto 
Protocol on Climate Change24—the reality is that the United States abides 
by the terms of countless treaties and executive agreements25 that have 
entered into force following the action of the political branches of our 
government, as prescribed by the Constitution.26   
The attention devoted to the Rome Statute and the Kyoto Protocol is 
justified inasmuch as our government’s position on whether to ratify these 
treaties is a legitimate subject of political debate.  But we must always 
distinguish between political questions concerning whether the United 
States should enter into a particular international agreement and legal 
questions concerning the lawfulness of conduct when measured against the 
yardstick of existing international obligations.  To put it another way:  a 
question about what obligations the United States should assume under 
international law is a political question and one on which the views of the 
judiciary are irrelevant.  
Moreover, the care and caution with which the United States enters into 
treaties is not new.  It is the traditional, and virtually unavoidable, care and 
caution taken by a country whose Constitution provides an explicit and 
honored place for international law—a country that takes the law seriously 
and that takes formal international obligations seriously.   
It is precisely because the United States takes the law seriously, and takes 
seriously the international legal obligations that it assumes, that its leaders 
are cautious and careful in their approach to new and complicated 
international agreements.  Again, this is true regardless of the party in 
power.  Although the United States is often accused of shirking its 
international obligations because of its unwillingness to ratify certain 
treaties, reluctance to assume new treaty obligations—whatever those 
obligations may be—does not necessarily translate into indifference to 
international law.  Indeed, I suggest to you that a refusal to ratify a treaty 
may indicate quite the opposite; not ratifying a treaty may signal just how 
                                                 
24 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. 
25 An executive agreement is “an international agreement entered into by the President, 
without approval by the Senate, and usually involving routine diplomatic or military matters.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 610 (8th ed. 2004).  For example, “[m]aking executive agreements to 
settle claims of American nationals against foreign governments is a particularly longstanding 
practice.”  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003).  For a discussion of 
congressional attempts to limit the President’s authority to make executive agreements 
throughout the latter half of the Twentieth Century, see Louis Henkin, Treaties in a 
Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 406, 417-19 (1989). 
26 See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties in Force 2005, http://www.state.gov/s/l/ 
treaties/c15824.htm. 
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seriously American administrations, of both major parties, regard the 
making of treaties. 
The care and caution of the United States in entering into international 
agreements is a result of the importance of our country in the international 
system and also a result of our abiding commitment to the rule of law.  
After all, the less important a state is in the international system the less 
consequential it may be whether that state does or does not comply with its 
treaty obligations.  And it is easy enough for an inconsequential state, and 
for authoritarian or totalitarian regimes with no tradition of the rule of law, 
to ratify treaties that they will quickly ignore and violate.27  Yet by requiring 
that two-thirds of the Senate consent to a treaty before its ratification, our 
Constitution ensures that we will not enter into binding legal obligations 
unless a broad consensus clearly supports the proposition that such 
obligations are both in the national interest and worth risking our national 
reputation. 
The former Soviet Union famously ratified all manner of international 
human rights treaties that it ignored in practice, while it cavalierly 
condemned the United States for refusing to ratify some agreements that, 
for example, seemed to conflict with American conceptions of free speech.28 
                                                 
27 Oona A. Hathaway’s “large-scale quantitative analysis of the relationship between human 
rights treaties and countries’ human rights practices,” Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights 
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1939 (2002), revealed that “[c]ountries with worse 
human rights ratings often ratify treaties at higher rates than those with better ratings, and 
human rights treaty ratification is often associated with worse ratings than otherwise 
expected.”  Id. at 2013-14.  These results, Professor Hathaway explained, may be traceable to 
the following “cross-cutting pressures”: 
Countries with worse human rights practices face greater potential costs 
of joining a treaty to the extent that they expect it to be monitored and 
enforced.  But they also stand to gain more from the expression of 
adherence to the treaty, particularly where they are under external 
pressure to exhibit their commitment to human rights norms.  At the 
same time, they may have less reputational capital to lose.  If countries 
with worse human rights practices also have worse reputations for law-
abidingness than those with better practices, they may be more willing to 
join treaties with which they are not certain they will be able to comply. 
Id. at 2013. 
 Similarly, Professor Hathaway’s analysis seems applicable to a nation-state that lacks 
economic, military, or cultural influence, which may benefit from expressing its commitment to 
a treaty, while risking relatively little in terms of its pre-ratification capital (reputational or 
otherwise) should it fail to comply. 
28 See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY 360-69 (1993) (discussing disagreements among socialist and non-socialist 
countries over restrictions on freedom of speech in the ICCPR); see also Hedrick Smith, Moscow 
Ratifies 2 U.N. Covenants on Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1973, at 1, 6 (discussing the 
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It may also be a simple task for the new government of a developing 
country to ratify treaties that it hopes will bolster its reputation abroad and 
serve an aspirational purpose at home.  For example, after the fall of the 
Taliban, Afghanistan ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.29  Yet without the political will or 
material means to make such a treaty anything but a series of empty 
promises, disillusionment both with the specific goals of the treaty and with 
the general principles of treaty-based law may follow.  The United States 
historically has not entered into treaties lightly precisely because it strives to 
be faithful to the principle that, as Justice Hugo Black wrote, “[g]reat 
nations, like great men, should keep their word.”30  
Moreover, political decisions declining to join a particular international 
agreement remind us of the simple fact that when the United States 
assumes treaty obligations, it does so under our democratic processes.  As 
noted earlier, the Constitution ensures that presidential decisions on treaties 
will invariably be affected by the views of the Senate.   
It is often forgotten that the Senate, on July 25, 1997, adopted, by a 
unanimous vote of 97-0, the Byrd-Hagel resolution.  This resolution, co-
sponsored by the senior Democratic member of the Senate, urged President 
Clinton not to submit to the Senate for its consideration the Kyoto Protocol.  
This unanimous resolution of the Senate apparently reflected the views of 
major constituencies, including organized labor as well as business.  In 
these circumstances, it should not surprise us that President Clinton 
effectively took the advice of the upper house of our democratically-elected 
legislature, and that his successor in the White House, President George W. 
Bush, did so as well.  
Moreover, while some proposed treaties garner substantial attention in 
the press because of our government’s reluctance to embrace them—like the 
Rome Statute and the Kyoto Protocol—many others, which are ratified by 
the United States, deal with mundane matters that one might not typically 
associate with international law:  for example, the recently ratified Treaty on 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment between the 
                                                                                                             
Soviet Union’s ratification of the ICCPR and ICESCR and reporting one U.S. State Department 
official as explaining that the United States had not signed the covenants because “they fell 
short of the American concept of human rights[,]” for example, the ICCPR “contained 
loopholes by which emigration could be barred . . . .”). 
29 G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 46 at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1981), 19 I.L.M. 
33 (1980); see also http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (memorializing 
Afghanistan’s ratification of the Convention). 
30 Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
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United States and Uruguay.31  Thus, we see a continuing commitment on 
the part of the American people to law-based international cooperation, not 
only in the treaties that we are cautiously reluctant to ratify but also in the 
treaties that we embrace and abide by. 
V.  THE REAL CONTROVERSIES:  
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEREMPTORY NORMS 
Thus far, I have tried to dispel, or at the very least complicate, the 
perception that international law is something new or exotic in the 
American system or a byproduct of Twentieth Century “globalization.”  I 
have also noted that high-profile political controversies regarding certain 
treaties tend to overshadow the uncontroversial uses of international law.  
In other words, international law is a long-standing framework or process 
that governs the interaction of nations and much of it is routine, offering 
little to excite the public imagination.   
I now turn to what I think is one of the more controversial aspects of 
international law today from both a political and legal perspective.  The 
controversy to which I refer has little to do with the Rome Statute, the 
Kyoto Protocol, or any other foreign policy dispute that dominates the 
headlines.  Instead, it is chiefly about the invocation of “international 
law”—and, in particular, “customary international law”—in our courts.   
We can all generally understand that international treaties are 
agreements pursuant to which the parties (that is, nation-states) expressly 
consent to be bound.  But “customary international law” is something 
different.  Roughly formulated, “customary international law” is that law 
which results not from an obligation assumed by a state pursuant to a treaty 
or other explicit agreement, but rather, from custom—that is, based on the 
general and consistent practice of states.   
And this is where things get a bit tricky, and where there is a 
heightened risk of the misuse of international law.  In the world of treaties, 
there is a sharp break between the political stage, leading up to ratification, 
and the legal stage, that may take place in a U.S. court if a treaty creates 
individual rights.32  On the other hand, because customary international law 
                                                 
31 See U.S. Senate, Treaties Approved by the Current Congress, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/one_item_and_teasers/trty_rtf.htm. 
32 See, e.g.,  Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases) , 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (noting that 
a “treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations” and “depends for the 
enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are 
parties to it”); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 389  (6th Cir. 2001) (“As a general 
rule . . . international treaties do not create rights that are privately enforceable in the federal 
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is generally not codified in any instrument that one can look to for an 
indication of a nation-state’s formal consent, it is easy for courts and 
commentators to ignore altogether the role of consent and to blur political 
questions with legal ones.   
I suggest that consent lies at the heart of the making of customary 
international law, just as it does with respect to treaty-based law.  The 
difficulty lies in reconciling this bedrock principle of consent with the fact 
that customary international law is a species of “common law,” in which 
judges must discern or identify what the law is.   
How does a state consent to customary international law when there 
exists no piece of paper to sign and ratify?  It does so by affirmative policy 
decisions, actions, and practices in the international arena indicating intent 
to be bound.  In order for a practice to be considered customary 
international law, states must universally engage in that practice out of 
opinio juris—that is, out of a sense of legal obligation rather than merely as an 
act of courtesy or grace.33  Put differently, customary international law 
consists of “those clear and unambiguous rules by which States universally 
abide, or to which they accede, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual 
concern . . . .”34 
It is perhaps possible, though highly unusual, for a rule of customary 
international law to be restated in a mere declaration or pronouncement by 
a group of countries—for example, a resolution of the U.N. General 
Assembly or some international conference.  Contrary to common 
misconception, the General Assembly is not a law-making body;35 and 
                                                                                                             
courts.”); United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir.  2001) (noting the “strong 
presumption against inferring individual rights from international treaties”); see also supra note 
20 (discussing the ICCPR). 
33 See, e.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 307-08 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed 
by them from a sense of legal obligation.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
added))). 
34 Flores v. S.  Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 252 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing CLIVE PARRY, THE 
SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1965)). 
35 See 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 248, 258, 269 (Bruno Simma 
ed., 2d ed. 2002) (describing the rejection of proposals to accord General Assembly resolutions 
the power to bind member States); D.W. BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 41 
(3d ed. 1975) (cautioning that “any attempt to draw analogies with a national assembly, 
parliament or legislature, is apt to be dangerous” and recognizing that General Assembly 
resolutions may “become evidence of international law” only “indirectly” and only if they 
“embody a consensus of opinion about what the law is . . . .”).  See generally Flores, 414 F.3d at 
259-61 (“Because General Assembly documents are at best merely advisory, they do not, on 
their own and without proof of uniform state practice . . . evidence an intent by member States 
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whether such a statement or resolution—by the General Assembly or by 
any multinational organization that does not have the power to make law—
accurately reflects a body of “customary international law” will depend on 
whether the pronouncement or declaration accurately represents the actual 
practice of states in their relations with one another.   
General Assembly resolutions and aspirational proclamations of 
international conferences, no matter how often repeated, are not in 
themselves a source of binding international norms.  As noted, 
“international agreements . . . despite their moral authority, have little 
utility. . . . ” in defining customary international law.36  To put the matter 
more simply and bluntly, zero multiplied 100 times is zero. 
Many factors would have to be considered by an observer or judge in 
deciding whether a certain pronouncement by a large number of countries 
is an authentic statement of a rule of law—including the specificity with 
which the principle is articulated; how many and which states have agreed 
to the relevant principle; and what, if any, tangible action the states have 
taken over time to implement the principle.37   
As you might guess from this description, customary international law 
has a “soft, indeterminate character”38 and this soft and indeterminate 
character can lead to confusion and even to the assertion of international 
law where none exists.  
Let us take, for example, suits brought under the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”), which states that “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”39  The 
Supreme Court has stated recently that “the law of nations” remains an 
“element of common law,” and that federal courts may recognize new 
causes of action under the ATS when they “rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
                                                                                                             
to be legally bound by their principles, and thus cannot give rise to rules of customary 
international law.”). 
36 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734-35 (holding that provisions of the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights and ICCPR do not create binding standards of customary international law). 
37 See I OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 26-27 (“[T]he substance of this 
source of international law is to be found in the practice of states.  The practice of states in this 
context embraces not only their external conduct with each other, but is also evidenced by such 
internal matters as their domestic legislation, judicial decisions, diplomatic despatches, internal 
government memoranda, and ministerial statements in Parliaments and elsewhere.”).  See 
generally Flores, 414 F.3d at 256-57. 
38 LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:  POLITICS AND VALUES 29 (1995). 
39 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
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comparable to the features of . . . 18th-century paradigms. . . .” such as 
piracy and the infringement of the rights of ambassadors.40   
Even with this guidance from the Supreme Court, parties to litigation 
may disagree over whether a particular rule of customary international law 
exists, and therefore whether it can legitimately form the basis for a legal 
action.  In the event of such a dispute, the role of a judge is to ascertain first 
whether a rule of customary international law in fact exists.  Secondly, if 
such a norm can be said to exist, a judge or jury must decide whether a 
party to the lawsuit has violated that law through its conduct.   
There are obvious challenges and dangers here—inherent in the role 
thrust upon judges to find or discern rules of law based on the examination 
of customary international practices or norms.  Although this style of 
common law adjudication may be familiar in our domestic law, it can have 
consequences greater than the “interstitial” development of a state’s 
common law of torts and contracts with which we are all familiar.41   
Because many judges are unfamiliar with the rarefied and obscure 
particulars of international law, they understandably look to the work of 
academic commentators on international law for guidance.  Indeed, it has 
long been understood that the writings of publicists—that is, jurists and 
academics—are an accepted source of customary international law, albeit a 
secondary or subsidiary source of that law.42  
Traditionally, international law scholars played a valuable role assisting 
courts by gathering information about the actual practices of states and 
                                                 
40 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004). 
41 See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (discussing the possibility of limiting the availability of 
relief in ATS suits through a “policy of case-specific deference to the political branches,” and 
citing as an example agreement between the governments of South Africa and the United 
States that suits against corporations alleged to have participated or abetted in the apartheid 
regime would interfere with the policy behind South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission).  As famously expressed by Justice Holmes, “judges do  and must  legislate, but 
they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.”  S. Pac. 
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
42 See Statute of International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, June 26, 1945, 
U.S.T.S. 993 (describing “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists . . .  as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” (emphasis added)); 
CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1965) (noting that 
recourse may be had to secondary sources such as “unilateral declarations, instructions to 
diplomatic agents, laws and ordinances, and, in a lesser degree, to the writings of authoritative 
jurists,” as evidence of the “acts” and “practice[s]” of states (emphasis added)); see also 
Remarks of Jack L. Goldsmith, Panel Discussion, Scholars in the Construction and Critique of 
International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 317, 318-19 (2000). 
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providing that information in the form of reliable secondary sources.43  That 
sort of scholarship generally exhibited a descriptive, positivist—and indeed, 
what we might call an “empirical”—approach to international law; the 
scholars sought to provide accurate accounts of the practices of states.  In 
short, the historic role of international law scholars was to identify what the 
rules of the game were.   
Today, scholars of international law are often not content to be mere 
compilers of state practices.  Instead, many scholars view their role as 
advocates or exponents of what the law should be.  The problem lies in 
conflating this theoretical and policy-driven discourse—which may indeed 
influence the political branches of our government to adopt certain practices 
that may one day give rise to customary international law—with evidence 
of current laws or practices. 
It was, I submit, eminently reasonable for courts in years past to rely on 
well-regarded positivist accounts as shortcuts for ascertaining customary 
international law.  On the other hand, it is questionable whether the policy 
views of international law scholars have any particular relevance to the 
identification of norms that, by definition, can only be established by the 
practice of nation-states.  When judges or others proclaim “international 
law” on the basis of the policy views of professors of international law, they 
are engaged, knowingly or unwittingly, in a misuse of the concepts of 
international law.   
It is essential to recall, as the Supreme Court stated in 1900, that works 
of scholars “are resorted to by the judicial tribunals . . . not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for 
                                                 
43 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 838 (1997) (“The traditional 
conception of [customary international law] was that it resulted from a general and consistent 
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 Several series of works descriptive of the international legal practices of the United States 
illustrate this earlier era of scholarship.  See, e.g., A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Francis Wharton ed., 1886-87) (a U.S. Government compilation of various 
official United States documents pertaining to international law); A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (John Bassett Moore ed., U.S. Government Printing Office 1906) (same); DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Green Haywood Hackworth ed., U.S. Government Printing Office 1940-
44) (same); DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marjorie M. Whiteman ed., U.S. Government 
Printing Office 1963-73) (same); see also INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS (Hersch Lauterpacht et al. 
eds., Grotius Publications LTD) (an analogous compilation of British materials published every 
one to four years, formerly under the title ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES ); LAW OFFICERS’ OPINIONS TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE 1793-1860 (Clive 
Parry ed., Gregg International 1970-73) (similar). 
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trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.”44  In other words, as the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has observed: 
scholars do not make law, and . . . it would be profoundly 
inconsistent with the law-making processes within and 
between States for courts to permit scholars to do so by 
relying upon their statements, standing alone, as sources of 
international law.  In a system governed by the rule of law, 
no private person—or group of men and women such as 
comprise the body of international law scholars—creates 
the law.45  
Yet many scholars of international law do not confine themselves to the 
seemingly tedious effort to report trends in state behavior.  Instead, they 
adopt a normative approach, seeking to persuade courts to identify 
particular rules that comport with their own normative views.46  These 
asserted rules may not necessarily reflect the actual state of customary 
international law.  Thus, these scholars make the mistake of conflating “the 
normative” with “the normal.”  That is to say, rather than seeking to 
discover “the normal” practice of sovereigns, they approach customary 
international law as an inquiry into “the normative” preferences of 
educated legal elites.   
The phenomenon of scholars attempting to shape law by purporting to 
identify existing law is not, of course, unique to international law.  It is a 
natural consequence of producing scholarly articles and books, and it is also 
the result of efforts by “private legislatures,” such as the American Law 
Institute (“ALI”), to “restate” the law.  Indeed, the proclaimed purpose of 
the ALI, it will be recalled, is to “promote the clarification and simplification 
of the law and its better adaptation to social needs.”47  In the realm of 
                                                 
44 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (emphasis added). 
45 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 102 (2d Cir. 2003); see also id. at 101-02 (discussing 
Professor Louis B. Sohn’s claim that “international law is made, not by states, but by ‘silly’ 
professors writing books”) (quoting Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 399, 399, 401 (1996)). 
46 Two leading commentators have suggested that “a major generational change is 
underway” in the international law academy.  Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New 
International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 463, 465 (2005-2006).  This “New 
International Law Scholarship,” which appears to cut across traditional political boundaries, 
“distinguish[es] normative and positive claims,” focuses on empirical scholarship, downplays 
doctrinalism, and is “influenced by social scientific theory and, especially, rational choice 
theory.”  Id. at 482-83. 
47 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE:  
A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS 1 (2001) (quoting the ALI’s 1923 Certificate of Incorporation); 
see also Harvey S. Perlman, The Restatement Process, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 2-3 (2000); Alan 
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international law, as in other areas of the law, restatements are not merely 
efforts to “restate” the law as it exists; in fact, the ALI explicitly instructs the 
reporters of its various restatements that they are “not compelled to adhere 
to . . . a preponderating balance of authority but [are] instead expected to 
propose the better rule and provide the rationale for choosing it.”48  
The effort to identify what the ALI calls the better rule is, by definition, 
a political enterprise, in which competing perspectives, personalities, and 
factions vie for the favorable final verdict of a self-selected elite.49   
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (“Restatement (Third)”) is especially interesting because it is an 
attempt by the ALI to codify a body of law for a realm that does not have 
the advantage of an authoritative legislature50 or a court whose decisions 
have the force of binding precedent.51  The innovations of the Restatement 
(Third) on the subject of customary international law have been, to put the 
matter mildly, controversial.  For instance, the Restatement (Third) suggests 
that customary international law might trump prior inconsistent statutory 
law.52  
                                                                                                             
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 
596 (1995) (explaining that restatements “are sets of rules, organized by subject matter, the 
content of which is partly a function of the case law but also is a function of the ALI’s collective 
view respecting which legal rules are normatively desirable for courts to apply”). 
48 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE:  
A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS 5 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
49 Id.  The ALI, a “self-perpetuating organization of lawyers, judges, and academics,” 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 47, at 596, is a selective “private law-reform group that chooses its 
own members,”  Id. at 600; see also id. at 597 (arguing that the ALI “produces clear, bright-line 
rules that confine judicial discretion commonly when and because dominant interest groups 
influence the process” and that “[t]hese bright-line rules ordinarily advance the interest 
group’s agenda”). 
50 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (illustrating the lack of a centralized system of 
enforcement in international law). 
51 See, e.g., The Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat. 
1055, 1062, 3 Bevans 1153, 1190 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103 cmt. b (1987) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (commenting that the “traditional view that there is no stare decisis in 
international law”); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN L. REV. 
429, 482 (2003) (noting that “even within a single international court there is often no system of 
binding precedent and no doctrine of stare decisis,” and concluding that “ [t]he refusal to treat 
precedents as binding is a long-entrenched practice in international adjudication that stems 
from the origins of the international judicial system in the ad hoc arbitral courts of the 
nineteenth century”). 
52 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 51, § 115(2) & cmt. d & Reporters’ Note 4.  Comment 
d states that “[i]t has . . . not been authoritatively determined whether a rule of customary 
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Some commentators have called the Restatement (Third)’s view that 
customary international law could supersede federal statutory law “pure 
bootstrapping,” noting that the only authority cited for that proposition in 
the Restatement (Third) is a single law review article by the Restatement 
(Third)’s own Reporter, which in turn merely cites an earlier draft of the 
Restatement (Third)—that is, the position is without external authority.53   
Because the Restatement (Third) itself proclaims that certain of its 
positions are “at variance”54 with the practice and customs followed by the 
United States in its international relations and incorrectly asserts that 
customary international law may trump United States statutory law, a 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has suggested that 
courts be vigilant and careful in considering the Restatement (Third), or 
other similar scholarship, as evidence of the customs, practices, or laws of 
the United States and/or evidence of customary international law.55 
The Restatement (Third)’s proposition that customary international law 
can preempt or trump domestic legislation is without foundation or merit.  
It is also at odds, I believe, with Supreme Court precedent.  In the seminal 
case of The Paquete Habana,56 the Supreme Court stated: 
International law is part of our law, and must be 
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of 
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.  For this purpose, where there is no treaty and 
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, 
                                                                                                             
international law that developed after, and is inconsistent with, an earlier statute or 
international agreement of the United States should be given effect as  the law of the United 
States.” 
53 Bradley & Goldsmith,  supra note 43, at 835-36 & nn.142-43; see also Michael Traynor, 
That’s Debatable:  The ALI as a Public Policy Forum, Part II, 25 THE ALI REPORTER, 1, 2 (2002) 
(noting that the rule was much debated when the Restatement (Third) was under discussion in 
the Institute and is not completely free from controversy now). 
54 The Director of the ALI notes in the foreword to the Restatement (Third) that it is “in no 
sense an official document of the United States,” and that “ [i]n a number of particulars the 
formulations in this Restatement are at variance with positions that have been taken by the 
United States Government.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 51, at IX.  These variations 
presumably are intentional because, although the ALI extended the Restatement (Third) project 
by a year to consider “communications received . . . from the Department of State and from the 
Justice Department,” it did not fully conform the Restatement to the positions expressed in 
those communications.  American Law Institute, Proceedings, 63d Annual Meeting, 1986, at 90 
(1987). 
55 U.S v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 99-100 & n.31 (2003). 
56 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
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resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations . . . .57 
The Supreme Court’s instruction to “resort to” customary international 
law only in the absence of a “treaty . . . [or] controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision” reveals a remarkable sensitivity to the 
nuanced role that consent plays in international law.  The Court understood 
that, in abiding by customary international law, which ultimately relies on 
policy and practice (implicitly reflecting the consent of the governed), the 
United States adheres to its democratic principles.58  But the Court also 
realized that—because determination of that consent depends on the 
judiciary’s assessment of difficult-to-discern practices and attitudes 
worldwide, often filtered through secondary sources that might lapse into 
speculation—courts should not risk overturning a clearer manifestation of 
those democratic principles embodied in already-existing domestic law. 
To put the matter another way, precisely because of the comparative 
difficulty of ascertaining the content of customary international law, courts 
run a particularly heightened risk of undue reliance on the normative views 
of academic commentators when they are called upon to determine whether 
there has been a violation of international law.  Most significantly, courts 
may be asked to apply, as part of domestic law, norms to which the United 
States has not consented or, indeed, obligations the United States has 
explicitly avoided, rejected, or disavowed. 
                                                 
57 Id. at 700 (emphasis added).  It is illuminating that commentators citing to The Paquete 
Habana “generally end at [the first] sentence and go on to assert far-ranging claims for 
application of international law in U.S. courts.”  Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U.S. 
Sovereignty, and the Death Penalty, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 547, 560 (2004); see also Sanchez, supra note 
7, at 196-97; see also JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 7 
(1996); Koh, supra note 6, at 43. 
58 The Court has further indicated its regard for customary international law by holding that 
a statute “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains.”  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 452 n.14 (White, J., 
dissenting).  This interpretive principle was articulated in MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 
416, 434 (1913): 
The statute should be construed in the light of the purpose of the 
government to act within the limitation of the principles of international 
law, the observance of which is so essential to the peace and harmony of 
nations, and it should not be assumed that Congress proposed to violate 
the obligations of this country to other nations, which it was the manifest 
purpose of the President to scrupulously observe, and which were 
founded upon the principles of international law. 
 Yet even here, the Court does not suggest that a statute can be discarded when a court 
identifies or recognizes a new rule of customary international law.  Allowing courts to nullify 
statutes in such a manner would do violence to the view that “judges do and must legislate, 
but they can do so only interstitially. . . .” S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
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A related question is the growing popularity of invocations of so-called 
peremptory norms of international law, also known as jus cogens norms.  In 
essence, a peremptory norm is one that is so fundamental that it binds a 
state, even if the state explicitly declines to accept the norm.  The 
paradigmatic examples of jus cogens norms are collective understandings 
that genocide and slavery should be prohibited.59   
As one well-known scholar of international law has stated, “there is no 
scholarly consensus on the methods by which to ascertain the existence of a 
peremptory norm, nor to assess its significance or determine its content.”60  
This indeterminancy invites “development” or expansion that ignores the 
basic principle that a jus cogens norm must be based on “authentic systemic 
consensus” that includes “all the essential components of the international 
community.”61  Since the United States is surely an “essential component of 
the international community,” it would seem impossible for a new or 
additional jus cogens norm to exist that has not been recognized at any point 
in the history of U.S. foreign relations or which contradicts the foreign 
relations practices of the United States.   
Nevertheless, some scholars wishing to help create international law 
obligations without regard to the political processes of nation-states have 
come to regard the concept of the peremptory norm, or jus cogens norm, as a 
useful wellspring for the effectuation of a host of domestic policy goals.  The 
result has been a proliferation of claimed new peremptory norms, or 
expansive definitions of the concept of established jus cogens norms, some of 
which have been the basis of claims in domestic lawsuits.62   
                                                 
59 See generally L. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 7-8 (“States may, by 
and within the limits of agreement between themselves, vary or even dispense altogether with 
most rules of international law.  There are, however, a few rules from which no derogation is 
permissible.”). 
60 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67 (1996) (“Scholars also disagree as to the means to identify the elements 
of a peremptory norm, to determine its priority over other competing or conflicting norms or 
principles, to assess the significance and outcomes of prior application, and to gauge its future 
applicability in light of the value - oriented goals sought to be achieved.”) 
61 LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:  POLITICS AND VALUES 39 (1995) (quoting 2 Y.B.  
INT’L L. COMM. 119 (1976)). 
62 See, e.g., Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 2002) (“ [T]here appears to be no 
basis for granting . . . federal habeas relief on the grounds that imposition of the death penalty 
for crimes committed while a juvenile would violate jus cogens norms of international law.”); 
Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 373-74 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting argument that imposition of the 
death penalty alone is a violation of jus cogens norms); Gisbert v. U.S. Atty Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 
1448 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim that detention of excludable aliens whose native country 
would not accept them back was a violation of jus cogens norms). 
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In other words, the lack of a rigorous methodology for determining jus 
cogens norms creates the following phenomenon:  Advocates unable to 
achieve particular policy objectives in American political arenas seek to 
achieve their policy objectives by securing pronouncements of international 
forums that purport to announce new or expanded peremptory norms so 
that these norms may, in turn, be invoked in our courts.  The effect of this 
end-run around our political institutions is that the source from which jus 
cogens norms derive their enduring strength—universal consensus that, 
once established, becomes non-derogable—is no longer part of the process 
of making law. 
The potential list of peremptory norms is apparently limited only by the 
imagination of those who would prefer a more robust set of legal 
restrictions on state behavior.63  However, not all unpopular or even 
deplorable conduct violates international law.64  Peremptory norms 
represent an exception to the basic rule that international law is based on the 
continuing consent of nation-states—and great expansions of the exception 
could threaten to swallow the rule.  The further that peremptory norms 
move away from the fundamental threats to international peace and 
security that form the core of jus cogens, such as genocide and slavery, the 
less regard countries may have for that core.65 
                                                 
63 See, e.g., Justin D. Cummins, Invigorating Labor: A Human Rights Approach in the United 
States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2005) (speculating that the “doctrine of jus cogens 
provides a potentially powerful path for prosecuting Civil-and Political-Covenant claims, and 
it could be a more effective vehicle than the [ATS] and Section 1983 combined,” and concluding 
that the doctrine “plainly should apply” to “the right to unionize and other crucial labor 
protections. . . .”); Ladan Askari, Girls’ Rights Under International Law: An Argument for 
Establishing Gender Equality as a Jus Cogens, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 3, 8 (1998) (“The 
set of established peremptory norms . . . can be extended to include a prohibition of gender 
discrimination.”).  I cite these examples not in any way to discourage furthering the interests 
addressed in the above articles, but to show that the connection between proposed expansions 
of jus cogens norms and the traditional principles behind such norms, such as universality and 
specificity, is not always clear. 
64 As Judge Friendly observed: 
We cannot subscribe to [the] view that the Eighth Commandment “Thou 
shalt not steal” is part of the law of nations.  While every civilized nation 
doubtless has this as a part of its legal system, a violation of the law of 
nations arises only when there has been “a violation by one or more 
individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the 
relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, 
and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings 
inter se.” 
IIT v. Vencap, LTD, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Lopes v. Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 
292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)); see also Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249-50 (2003). 
65 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 
537-38 (2002): 
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Because principles of customary international law generally, and jus 
cogens norms in particular, are difficult to identify, they are vulnerable to 
manipulation.  In determining customary international law, judges 
increasingly are asked to rely on asserted “international opinion” drawn 
from the domestic political trends in some preferred states rather than the 
universal, actual practice of states in their relations with one another.  In 
addition, some commentators try to shape or direct the law by asserting 
supposed rules of customary international law that are grounded in vague 
pronouncements by international organizations or foreign tribunals rather 
than in the specific international practices of nation-states. 
I do not suggest that academic students of international law should not 
play a role in the development of the law or legal institutions; quite the 
contrary.  Nor do I take issue with judges who, in good faith, look to 
academic writings and adopt the interpretations of particular scholars when 
identifying and applying customary international law to real-world 
disputes.  But all of us, especially judges, should be wary of normative 
scholarship in an area of the law that is supposed to be based on the consent 
and actual practices of nation-states. 
The misuse of international law will invariably lead to cynicism and 
breed resistance to the very idea of international law, giving credence to the 
criticism of international law noted by Isaiah Berlin, that international law 
simply “does not exist.”66  
We rely upon the rigor of the common law style of adjudication and the 
integrity of our judges to prevent the misuse of customary international law. 
 None of us should wish to live under a law that is merely a statement of the 
personal preferences or visions of justice of tenured law professors or 
tenured judges.  A claim under customary international law asserted in our 
courts should only be based on a violation of “well-established, universally 
recognized norms” governing relations between states.67  To preserve the 
integrity of customary international law, we must strive to find it in a 
                                                                                                             
As a normative matter, it may be difficult to justify the placement of 
capital punishment for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old murderers in the 
same category as  genocide, slavery, and torture.  Indeed, there is a 
danger that the “shock the conscience” nature of the jus cogens concept 
will be undermined by expanding the category in this way.  Although this 
observation obviously depends to some extent on a subjective assessment, 
the behavior of nations appears to bear it out. 
Id.  For examples of cases where courts rejected expansive jus cogens norms, see supra note 62. 
66 See Szasz, supra note 2, at 60. 
67 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/5
2007] International Law by Consent 143 
“rigorous, systematic, or legal manner,” and we must avoid the assertion of 
“rules” of customary international law that are supported only by 
“amorphous, general principles.”68 
As a general rule, international law, in its various manifestations, rests 
on the consent of sovereign nation-states.  Customary international law is 
comprised of the well-established, universal practices of sovereign nation-
states in their relations with one-another, not merely practices universally 
adopted by states.69   
If customary international law becomes completely unmoored from the 
basic principle of consent by sovereign states in their relations with one 
another—in other words, if it becomes wholly detached from the idea of 
consent of the governed—it risks losing legitimacy. 
If courts abandon the principle of consent, and find law where none 
exists—for example, on the basis of views of scholars or the recurring 
proclamations of public and private organizations not expressly authorized 
by treaty to make law—the result is predictable:  our elected officials will 
seek to regain their rightful roles as the makers of foreign policy and the 
representatives of the popular will.  The very idea of customary 
international law may be discredited, and the talismanic defense of “judicial 
independence” will then ring hollow.  
Those who wish the United States well in an international system based 
on law should be especially anxious to assure that international law is not 
brought into disrepute by its misuse.  Americans across the political 
spectrum, Democrats and Republicans alike, treasure the survival of the 
United States as a sovereign and independent country.  And if historical 
circumstance and fortune have made the United States a world power with 
friends and allies that deserve our support and protection, it is likewise 
clear that Americans wish it to be so.  
If the United States is to remain, in Lincoln’s words, “the last, best hope 
of earth,”70 we should happily recognize that the international legal 
obligations enforced against the United States, or successfully asserted by 
litigants in the courts of the United States, are generally those legal 
obligations that the United States has freely assumed in its relations with 
                                                 
68 Flores, 414 F.3d at 252 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 and Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re 
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
69 See supra note 64. 
70 Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:  HIS 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 688 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946). 
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other states—those legal obligations to which the United States has 
knowingly consented—under its democratic system of government. 
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